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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 03-3296

SYLVESTER HAMILTON,
Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA No. A43 094 961)

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 13, 2004
Before: RENDELL, COWEN and LAY*, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 14, 2004)

OPINION OF THE COURT

*Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by
designation.

LAY, Circuit Judge.
Sylvester Hamilton seeks review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (the “Board”) vacating the order of an immigration judge (“IJ”) that removed the
conditional basis of Hamilton’s lawful permanent resident status. Because we hold that
we lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision, we will deny the petition for review.

BACKGROUND
Hamilton, a native and citizen of Jamaica, married a United States citizen on
August 16, 1990, and entered the United States on December 23, 1991, as a lawful
permanent resident on a conditional basis. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1). In order for the
conditional basis of Hamilton’s lawful permanent resident status to be removed, Hamilton
and his wife had to file a joint petition for removal of the condition and appear together
for a personal interview. Id. § 1186a(c)(1). Because a joint petition was never filed,
Hamilton petitioned for discretionary removal of the condition under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1186a(c)(4), which authorizes the Attorney General to waive the joint filing
requirement if one of three “hardship” categories is met. One of the categories allows a
waiver of the joint filing requirement if the marriage was entered into in good faith but
later terminated, other than through death of the spouse, and the alien was not at fault in
failing to file the joint petition. Id. § 1186a(c)(4)(B). Another category allows a wavier if
the marriage was entered into in good faith but during the marriage the alien spouse was
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subjected to extreme cruelty by the citizen spouse and was not at fault in failing to file the
joint petition. Id. § 1186a(c)(4)(C).
On June 4, 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) denied
Hamilton’s petition, finding that he did not qualify for a waiver of the joint filing
requirement. As a result, Hamilton’s conditional permanent resident status was
terminated. On June 25, 1998, the INS served Hamilton with a notice to appear, charging
him with being removable because his conditional permanent resident status had been
terminated. Following a hearing in immigration court, the IJ found that Hamilton was
eligible for a waiver of the joint filing requirement under § 1186a(c)(4)(B) and granted
his petition to remove the conditional basis of his lawful permanent resident status.
The INS appealed to the Board. On July 7, 2003, the Board sustained the appeal
and vacated the IJ’s opinion, concluding Hamilton failed to meet his burden of
establishing that he entered into the marriage in good faith. The Board ordered that
Hamilton either voluntarily depart from the United States or be removed to Jamaica.
Hamilton petitioned for review of the Board’s decision.

DISCUSSION
We must consider our jurisdiction over Hamilton’s petition. The Board’s removal
order was not referred to the Attorney General for review and is therefore
administratively final. Thus, our jurisdiction over Hamilton’s petition for review would
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arise under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), which provides for judicial review of final orders of
removal. However, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) divests courts of jurisdiction to review any
“decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which is specified under this
subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General, other than the granting of relief
under section 1158(a) of this title.” Id.1
Section 1186a(c)(4) leaves it to the Attorney General’s discretion whether to
remove the conditional basis of an alien’s lawful permanent resident status absent the
filing of a joint petition. Id. § 1186a(c)(4). Stated another way, the Attorney General has
discretion to grant a “hardship waiver” of the joint filing requirement provided the alien
can demonstrate, inter alia, that “the qualifying marriage was entered into in good faith.”
Id. In this regard, “[t]he determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be
given that evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the Attorney General.” Id. In
this case, the Board concluded that Hamilton was not entitled to a hardship waiver
because he had not met his burden of demonstrating a good-faith marriage. We conclude
that this determination is a discretionary decision that we may not review.
Our conclusion is supported by Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176 (3d
Cir. 2003). In Mendez, we considered whether we had jurisdiction to review the Board’s
decision denying M endez’s request for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
1

The phrase “under this subchapter” refers to subchapter II of Chapter 12 of Title 8,
which includes sections 1151 through 1378. See CDI Info. Servs., Inc. v. Reno, 278 F.3d
616, 619 (6th Cir. 2002). Thus, the section at issue in this case, § 1186a, falls within this
subchapter.
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Id. at 176. Pursuant to § 1229b, the Attorney General may cancel the removal of an alien
if four requirements are met, including the requirement that removal would result in
extreme hardship. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). In Mendez, the Board determined that
Mendez failed to meet the hardship requirement and denied his request for discretionary
cancellation of removal. Mendez, 338 F.3d at 177. We held that we were without
jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision because whether an alien had met the hardship
requirement was a discretionary decision. Id. at 179.
As in Mendez, the Board determined that Hamilton had not met the requirement of
demonstrating that his marriage was entered into in good faith, effectively denying
Hamilton’s request for a hardship waiver under § 1186a(c)(4). We conclude that the
determination of whether Hamilton demonstrated the requirements for a hardship waiver
“is a quintessential discretionary judgment.” Mendez, 338 F.3d at 179. Furthermore, the
authority to grant a hardship waiver is clearly within the discretion of the Attorney
General and thus falls squarely within the plain language of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision, and the petition for
review will be denied.

5

